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WAIVING GOODBYE TO NONDISCLOSURE UNDER 
FOIA’S EXEMPTION 4: THE SCOPE AND 
APPLICABILITY OF THE WAIVER DOCTRINE 
Patrick Lightfoot+ 
Congress designed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 to provide the 
general public with broad access to information held by government agencies.2  
However, Congress limited the scope of disclosure by enumerating nine 
specific exemptions, which entitle the government to withhold certain 
information from release.3  The fourth FOIA exemption protects confidential 
commercial and financial information that private entities have provided to the 
government.4  Traditionally, courts will find that an agency has waived the 
protection of a FOIA exemption under the public-domain doctrine if the 
information requested has been made available in a permanent public record.5  
The Ninth Circuit recently disturbed this long-held trend of applying the 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.S., 2010, Cornell University.  The author would like to thank Daria Zane for her invaluable 
insight and expertise.  The author also wishes to thank his family and friends for their constant 
support and encouragement and his colleagues on the Catholic University Law Review for their 
diligent work in bringing this Comment to publication. 
 1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 2. See S. REP NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965) (asserting that the purpose of the Act is to eliminate 
the loopholes in previous disclosure law to promote full agency disclosure, absent a specific 
exception); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 1 (1966) (stating that the Act revises previous law 
to increase disclosure to the general public).  Both congressional reports accompanied Senate Bill 
1160, which Congress ultimately enacted as FOIA on July 4, 1996.  Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250 (1996) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552). 
 3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (specifying the nine statutory exemptions). 
 4. Id. § 552(b)(4) (exempting from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or confidential”).  The information is 
protected to prevent harm to competition, which will likely result from disclosure of such 
information.  See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 
1974).  Exemption 4 is unique because it shields from disclosure information obtained from a 
person outside of the agency who intends for that information to be confidential.  See Benson v. 
Gen. Servs. Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff’d, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 
1969); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10; S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (explaining that this 
exemption protects persons who otherwise would not release the information). 
 5. See Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that information 
loses protection under certain exemptions once it enters the public domain and is preserved in a 
permanent public record); see also Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
891 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the first and third exemptions cannot be invoked if 
the government officially disclosed the information previously); U.S. Student Ass’n v. CIA, 620 
F. Supp. 565, 571 (D.D.C. 1985) (“It is well established that specific information cannot be 
withheld [under the first and third exemption] if it has been the subject of prior ‘official and 
documented disclosure.’” (quoting Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 
1983))). 
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public-domain doctrine by introducing a new test in determining the waiver of 
Exemption 4.6  In Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Protection, the 
Ninth Circuit created a new “unlimited disclosure” test, concluding that an 
agency waives its entitlement to a FOIA exemption when it freely discloses 
confidential information to a person without restricting that person’s ability to 
further disclose that information.7 
The public-domain test is the prevailing rule among the circuit courts of 
appeal.8  For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
applied the test in Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the government had 
waived Exemption 4 through the release of automakers’ air-bag-system 
information to manufacturers. 9   The D.C. Circuit approved of the district 
court’s holding that limited disclosures to people who required the information 
was not automatically equivalent to a release of the information to the general 
public.10  
Congress enacted FOIA under the overarching “philosophy of full agency 
disclosure.”11   The nine exemptions limiting disclosure do not negate this 
policy, and the Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s intent for all FOIA 
exemptions to be narrowly construed.12  Exemption 4 protects information that 
the federal government receives from others by necessitating a certain amount 
of confidentiality so that “a citizen [may] be able to confide in his 
Government.”13  The public-domain test reflects both FOIA’s broad disclosure 
policy and Exemption 4’s protection.14 
                                                 
 6. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1196–99 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“While the public domain test will be persuasive in most cases, it does not reach the 
concerns of confidentiality in circumstances like those presented in this case.”). 
 7. Id. at 1196.  The court acknowledged that the Agency in question was required by 
statute to disclose the information, but reasoned that the Agency’s “no-strings-attached” 
disclosure that did not limit further dissemination waived confidentiality.  Id. at 1197. 
 8. See infra Part I.D. 
 9. 244 F.3d 144, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 10. See id. 152–53; see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
93 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2000) rev’d in part on other grounds, 244 F.3d 144. 
 11. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also infra Part I.B. 
 12. See, e.g., Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (stating that FOIA’s 
broad policy of disclosure limits the Act’s exemptions); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 & n.6 
(1972) (observing that Congress intended a policy of broad disclosure when enacting FOIA, 
subject to specifically delineated exceptions (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965))), superseded 
by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(a), § 553(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 
(amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) to require that information classified as secret in the interest of 
national security or foreign policy by executive order be in fact properly classified as such); see 
also Bristol Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (recognizing the primary 
intent of FOIA to increase public access to government records and to close loopholes in previous 
disclosure legislation). 
 13. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966) (stating that Exemption 4 “would assure the 
confidentiality of information obtained by the Government”); see also Gen. Servs. Admin. v. 
Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969) (affirming the district court’s interpretation of 
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Yet, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Watkins constitutes a puzzling departure 
from the well-settled public-domain test.15 Watkins’s expansion of the waiver 
doctrine will have unintended negative consequences.  Corporations and 
business entities whose information Congress intended Exemption 4 to protect 
will be less willing to provide information to the government voluntarily,16 and 
when compelled to do so, will provide less reliable information for fear that the 
slightest government disclosure will subject the information to full public 
access under FOIA. 17   Thus, despite granting the public greater access to 
information in the short term,18 an expansion of the waiver doctrine would 
cause a decrease in both the quality and quantity of information provided to the 
government—a result directly at odds with FOIA’s primary purpose.19 
This Comment examines the Ninth Circuit’s recent departure from the  
well-recognized test for determining waiver, and analyzes both the  
public-domain test and the Ninth Circuit’s unlimited-disclosure test in the 
context of Exemption 4.  Part I provides a historical perspective by examining 
the early law of public disclosure, including section 3 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and the later enactment of FOIA.  Part I also surveys the 
changing interpretations of Exemption 4 and the development of the waiver 
doctrine.  Lastly, Part I examines Center for Auto Safety and Watkins in 
significant detail.  Part II demonstrates how the new Watkins test contradicts 
well-established principles underlying the waiver doctrine, which requires an 
official, public disclosure to constitute waiver.  Finally, Part III advocates for 
the uniform adoption of the public-domain test through one of three 
mechanisms—a Supreme Court holding, a legislative amendment to FOIA, or 
a modification of importation regulations—as the best solution to further the 
purposes underlying FOIA. 
                                                                                                                 
Exemption 4 as applying only to information “obtained from a person outside the  
agency . . . [who] wishes the information to be kept confidential” (quoting Benson v. Gen. Servs. 
Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968))). 
 14. See infra Part I.B–C (recognizing that a balance must be struck between confidentiality 
and public access to information). 
 15. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (determining that the public-domain test should not be the only test for government 
waiver because it did not fit the confidentiality concerns generated by the particular case). 
 16. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992)  
(“Where . . . the information is provided to the Government voluntarily, the presumption is that 
its interest will be threatened by disclosure as the persons whose confidences have been betrayed 
will, in all likelihood, refuse further cooperation.”). 
 17. See id. (“[W]here the production of information is compelled . . . disclosure could affect 
the reliability of such data . . . [thus] the governmental impact inquiry will focus on the possible 
effect of disclosure on its quality.”). 
 18. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–98 (providing another means for the release of 
information). 
 19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of FOIA). 
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I.  THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT DISCLOSURE LAW: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, FOIA, EXEMPTION 4, AND THE WAIVER 
DOCTRINE 
A.  The Administrative Procedure Act: Precursor to FOIA and an “[E]xcuse 
for [S]ecrecy”20 
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) was the federal 
government’s first major attempt to organize federal administrative-agency 
information. 21   The APA allowed the public access to government 
information.22  In particular, section 3 of the APA originally provided for the 
release of government information unless it involved: “(1) any function of the 
United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating 
solely to the internal management of an agency.”23   
Despite section 3’s broad disclosure policy, “gaping loop-holes”24 provided 
the government with “numerous excuses” for withholding information. 25   
Consequently, disclosure of official records was only available for “persons 
properly and directly concerned,” and information could be withheld from 
disclosure for good cause.26  Government agencies refused to release properly 
disclosable information in “case after case.”27  In proposing revisions to the 
                                                 
 20. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965). 
 21. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-505, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current 
version in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).  The APA was “an attempt to settle . . . [the] escalating 
conflict between public demands for agency transparency and the government’s need to keep 
some information confidential.”  Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of 
Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public 
Interest in Knowing What the Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 521 (2006). 
 22. Administrative Procedure Act § 3 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court 
Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose” Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
983, 993 (2002). 
 25. 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8437, at 504; see also JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE RIGHT TO 
KNOW: YOUR GUIDE TO USING AND DEFENDING FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 14 (2009) (stating that “little information was actually released” under 
section 3). 
 26. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(c); see also Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 21, at 
522 (“This restriction thus blocked third parties, such as journalists, attorneys, public interests 
groups, scientists and historians, from getting hold of government records.”). 
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 5 (1966). 
The misapplication of these minor exceptions soon made the Administrative Procedure 
Act the fountainhead of secrecy within government.  Federal agencies exploited the 
vague provisions in the act requiring “secrecy in the public interest” or “for good 
cause,” and also claimed the right to deny requests for information “relating solely to 
the internal management of an agency” unless the requestor was “properly and directly 
concerned.”  Armed with such implied authority, the government routinely denied 
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APA, members of Congress observed that section 3 was “used more as an 
excuse for withholding than as a disclosure statute.”28  To make matters worse, 
section 3 “failed to provide a judicial remedy for wrongfully withholding 
information, thus allowing capricious administrative decisions forbidding 
disclosure to go unchecked.”29   Those whose requests for disclosure were 
rejected were left without any recourse.30   
Shortly after the enactment of section 3, President Harry Truman expanded 
government secrecy by issuing an executive order allowing nonmilitary 
agencies to classify information, thus making section 3’s shortcomings 
increasingly apparent.31  The growing abuse of section 3’s inherent loopholes 
to expand government secrecy, typified by this executive order, fueled the fire 
for reform.32 
B.  The Freedom of Information Act: More Disclosure and More Debate 
In 1966, Congress amended section 3 of the APA33 through the enactment of 
FOIA in an effort to end the policy of obstructionism that section 3 
permitted.34  Considered “a momentous occasion,” the passage of FOIA made 
the United States the third country in the world to enact such legislation.35  
FOIA expanded access beyond just those “properly and directly concerned,” 
                                                                                                                 
public access to such aged and harmless materials as George Washington’s intelligence 
methods and a Confederate general’s memoirs. 
HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS 
AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 36 (1999); see also Halstuk  
& Chamberlin, supra note 21, at 522 (“[T]he APA contained numerous caveats and loopholes 
that federal agencies routinely exploited to block public access to their records.”). 
 28. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (stating 
that the public-disclosure section of the APA was “generally recognized as falling far short of its 
disclosure goals”), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(a),  
§ 552(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)).  Congress also recognized 
that the statute was “full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the 
public.”  S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3. 
 29. Kenneth D. Salomon & Lawrence H. Wechsler, Note, The Freedom of Information  
Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150, 151 (1969). 
 30. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 5 (“The Administrative Procedure Act provides 
no adequate remedy to members of the public to force disclosures . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 
5 (“There is no remedy in case of wrongful withholding of information from citizens by 
Government officials.”). 
 31. Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the OPEN Government 
Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427, 435 (2008) (citing Exec. Order No. 
10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789, 790 (1949–1953)). 
 32. Id. at 434–35. 
 33. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (2006)). 
 34. See KLOSEK, supra note 25, at 14 (explaining that FOIA was enacted after a push for a 
more comprehensive law to replace the failed section 3). 
 35. Id.; see also FOERSTEL, supra note 27, at 44 (describing FOIA as “trailblazing 
legislation”). 
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and instead permits any person to obtain information from the government.36  
In contrast with section 3, FOIA requires agency disclosure by default,37 only 
permitting agencies to withhold information covered under one of the nine 
specific exemptions.38  More importantly, FOIA created a system of judicial 
review, giving members of the public a forum in which they can voice their 
claims.39   
Despite FOIA’s benefits, agencies implemented the Act reluctantly.40  Much 
to the disappointment of the law’s proponents, agencies did not immediately 
embrace FOIA’s underlying policies of open government and disclosure.41  
Eventually in 1972, Congress acknowledged FOIA’s deficiencies 42  and 
amended the Act in 1974.43  Congress has since amended FOIA five times: 
revising the exemptions in 1976 and 1986, 44  updating FOIA in 1996 in 
response to the growth in Internet usage and electronically available 
                                                 
 36. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A); see also S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 5 (1965) (stating that “the 
public as a whole has a right to know what its Government is doing”). 
 37. 110 AM. JUR. TRIALS Litigation Under the Freedom of Information Act § 2 (2008) 
(“Under FOIA, agencies of the federal government have a duty to fully disclose any and all 
records unless such information is subject to one of the specific nine statutory exemptions . . . .”). 
 38. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (specifying the nine exemptions 
that permit withholding information). 
 39. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (“[FOIA] seeks to 
permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts 
to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling 
official hands.”), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(a),  
§ 552(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)). 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 8 (1972); see also FOERSTEL, supra note 27, at 44, 71 
(explaining how, despite public support for FOIA and its policy of broad disclosure, opposition 
by the federal bureaucracy and executive resistance impeded the Act’s success). 
 41. See Halstuk, supra note 31, at 444 (noting that the years immediately following FOIA’s 
enactment were disappointing); see also Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No 
Clothes, REG.: AEI J. GOV’T & SOC’Y, Mar.–Apr. 1982, at 14, reprinted in FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION 117 (Robert G. Vaughn ed., 2000) (describing how agencies resisted FOIA by 
delaying responses for documents, replying with arbitrary denials, and overclassifying 
documents). 
 42. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 8 (describing the operation of FOIA as “hindered by 5 
years of foot-dragging by the Federal bureaucracy,” and the bureaucracy’s “widespread 
reluctance . . . to honor the public’s legal right to know”). 
 43. See Act of Nov. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. at 1561; see also Halstuk, supra note 31, at 445 
(describing how the political climate in 1974 provided an appropriate time period to reform FOIA 
in light of President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal).  Congress’s primary changes to FOIA 
involved  modifications of Exemption 1, covering national-security information, and Exemption 
7, covering law enforcement.  Halstuk, supra note 31, at 446 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (7) 
(2006)).  These changes were necessary “because both [exemptions] contained overbroad 
language that led to arbitrary enforcement and made it possible for agencies to justify withholding 
decisions,” inconsistent with Congress’s intent.  Id.  
 44.  Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, secs. 1801–1804,  
§ 552(a), (b)(7), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 to -50 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552); 
Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241, 1242 (1976) (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
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information,45 attempting to streamline the FOIA request process in 2007,46 
and revising Exemption 3 in 2009.47 
C.  Exemption 4: Trade Secrets and Commercial or Financial Information 
Exemption 4 exempts from disclosure information that includes “trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential.”48  The D.C. Circuit has defined a trade secret as a 
“secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used 
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities 
and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial 
effort.”49  This definition implies that the trade-secret information must be 
directly related to the productive process.50 
Exemption 4’s second clause covering “commercial or financial 
information” has caused much confusion among courts and scholars.51  This 
clause only exempts “information which is (a) commercial or financial, (b) 
obtained from a person, and (c) privileged or confidential.” 52   If the 
information is not a trade secret, then all three of these elements must be 
                                                 
 45. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 
§§ 1–11, 110 Stat. 3048, 3048–54 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. III 
2009)).  These amendments clarified that FOIA applied to electronic and digitized information.  
Halstuk, supra note 31, at 454.  Additionally, they provided easier public access by requiring 
agencies to make available on the Internet commonly requested information such as “agency 
annual reports, statements of agency rules and policy, agency adjudicative opinions, and FOIA 
handbooks.”  Id. 
 46. See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, 2524 (“To 
promote accessibility, accountability, and openness in Government . . . .”). 
 47. OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, sec. 64, § 552(b)(3), 123 Stat. 2141, 
2184 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).  Notably, this language denotes only two categories of exempt 
information: (1) trade secrets and (2) commercial or financial information that is both obtained 
from a person and privileged or confidential.  See Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 787–88 (1967).  Although it is possible to view 
“commercial or financial information obtained from any person” and “privileged or confidential” 
as distinct categories, such an interpretation stretches the language and does violence to the 
statute.  Id. (“Congress could not have intended to exempt all commercial or financial information 
obtained from any person.”); see also Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 
1286 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (interpreting Exemption 4 to require proof of confidentiality when 
attempting to withhold commercial information that does not constitute trade secrets). 
 49. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 704 F.2d at 1288. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 48, at 787 (referring to Exemption 4 as “probably the most 
troublesome provision in the Act”); Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and The 
Regulations, 58 GEO. L.J. 18, 34 (1967) (“Exemption (b)(4) is probably the most confusing of the 
nine.”); Exemption 4, Freedom of Information Act Guide, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (May 2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption4.htm (stating that the “overwhelming bulk of Exemption 4 
cases focus on whether the withheld information” falls with its second, much larger category). 
 52. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (quoting Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)). 
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satisfied for Exemption 4 to apply.53  The interpretation of each element has 
evolved from both FOIA’s legislative history and judicial interpretation.54 
1.  Commercial or Financial Information 
Neither FOIA’s statutory language, nor its legislative history defines 
“commercial” or “financial.”55  Consequently, courts have used the ordinary 
meaning of the terms when conducting Exemption 4 analysis.56  However, 
even after adopting the ordinary meaning of “commercial,” courts have failed 
to provide a clear definition of what that term means.57  Although the Senate 
and House reports offer examples of commercial or financial information, such 
as “business sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, scientific or 
manufacturing processes or developments, and negotiation positions or 
requirements in the case of labor-management mediations,” the reports provide 
no bright-line definition. 58   Therefore, information is evaluated on a  
case-by-case basis, rather than using a clear formula.59 
2.  Obtained from a Person 
The APA, although not using language like “commercial or financial,” did 
provide a definition of “person,” which applies to Exemption 4’s requirement 
that information be “obtained from a person.” 60   Courts have broadly 
interpreted this phrase in conjunction with “commercial or financial 
information,” 61  and have concluded that the exemption is not limited to 
commercial or financial information about the provider of the information; 
rather, it extends to protect such information about a third party even where the 
                                                 
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra Part I.C.1-3. 
 55. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining terms applicable to § 552); see 
also Davis, supra note 48, at 789 (commenting that the legislative history fails to explain the use 
of the terms “commercial” or “financial”). 
 56. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 
1983); Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 266 (D.C. Cir. 
1982); see also Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 627 F.2d 392, 403 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 57. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 704 F.2d at 1290 (finding that information 
can qualify as commercial if the provider of the information has a “commercial interest” in it). 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966); see also S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965). 
 59. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 704 F.2d at 1290 (finding that health and 
safety information regarding a person’s products is commercial because it is “instrumental in 
gaining market approval” for the products); Dow Jones Co. v. FERC, 219 F.R.D. 167, 176 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (noting upon review of the business information submitted by the defendant that 
information relating to “business decisions and practices regarding the sale of power” was 
commercial); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Exp.-Imp. Bank, 108 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(holding export-insurance applications to be commercial). 
 60. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (“‘[P]erson’ includes an individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or public or private organization other than an agency.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi., 627 F.2d at 405. 
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government obtained the information from someone other than that third 
party.62  
3.  Privileged or Confidential 
Determining whether the information at issue is privileged or confidential is 
the most challenging element of Exemption 4.63  Unlike the other components, 
FOIA’s legislative history informs the meaning of “confidential” and 
“privileged.”64  As revealed in the language of the Senate and House reports, 
Congress envisioned two primary situations in which Exemption 4 protects 
confidential information: (1) where the government has promised to keep the 
information confidential, and (2) where the information customarily would not 
be made public.65 
a.  Promises of Confidentiality  
In 1969, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the first situation—promises of 
confidentiality—in General Services Administration v. Benson.66  The district 
court held that Exemption 4 applies to information that an individual desires to 
                                                 
 62. Id.  In Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
the D.C. Circuit rejected the Board of Trade’s argument that Exemption 4 was limited to 
commercial or financial information that was obtained from the Trading Commission, which was 
the “source of the information.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit noted that the legislative history was 
“sufficiently broad to encompass financial and commercial information concerning a third party,” 
and there was no indication that Congress meant to limit the exemption to the extent urged by the 
Board of Trade.  Id. 
 63. See Exemption 4, Freedom of Information Act Guide, supra note 51 (“By far, most 
Exemption 4 litigation has focused on whether or not requested information is  
‘confidential’ . . . .”). 
 64. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966).  
These two reports are the most instructive in regard to legislative history and are relied on 
extensively.  See Davis, supra note 48, at 762 (“[P]robably more than ninety-five per cent of the 
useful legislative history is found in a ten page Senate committee report and in a fourteen page 
House committee report.” (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497 at 10; S. REP. NO. 89-813 at 9)).  The 
Senate report provides little insight into confidentiality except for explaining that the exemption 
protects information “which would customarily not be released to the public by the person from 
whom it was obtained.”  S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9.  However, the House report elaborated further 
that it exempts “information which is given to an agency in confidence.”  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, 
at 10.  The House report added that “where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not 
to disclose documents or information which it receives, it should be able to honor such 
obligations.”  Id.  Both reports identify privileged information as information that is “customarily 
subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges.”  S. REP. 
NO. 89-813, at 9 (providing as an example any commercial, technical, and financial data provided 
by a person seeking a loan to a lending agency in connection with a loan); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
89-1497, at 10. 
 65. See supra note 64. 
 66. 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969).  A partnership, of which Benson was a member, 
purchased property from the General Services Administration (GSA).  Id.  Benson requested 
records from the transaction, which the GSA refused to disclose based on several FOIA 
exemptions, including Exemption 4.  Id. 
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keep confidential, and only provides “under the express or implied promise by 
the government that the information will be kept confidential.”67  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the district court’s reasoning and affirmed its decision.68 
b.  Not Customarily Released to the Public 
The D.C. Circuit has decided the leading cases regarding the second 
situation—information that is customarily not released to the public.69   In 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, the D.C. Circuit held that that the information was 
confidential because it was of the type “which would customarily not be 
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.”70   
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia adopted a more narrow 
interpretation of confidentiality in M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC.71  The court 
maintained that Exemption 4 requires more than a “bare claim of 
confidentiality” by the provider of the information or the agency seeking to 
withhold the information.72  Rather, courts have a duty to independently assess 
a purported claim of confidentiality to determine objectively whether the 
information at issue is of the type that an individual would not customarily 
reveal to the public.73  The court synthesized two prior holdings of the D.C. 
Circuit to suggest that allowing agencies to withhold information based on 
                                                 
 67. Benson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff’d, 415 
F.2d at 878. 
 68. Gen. Servs. Admin., 415 F.2d at 881–82. 
 69. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agreeing with the 
district court’s assessment that the documents concerning business sales would customarily not be 
released to the public, and were therefore exempt from disclosure); see also Nat’l Parks  
& Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (explaining that although the 
determination of whether information would customarily be released to the public is an important 
inquiry for determining when information is confidential, it is not the only inquiry); Critical Mass 
Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (applying the National Parks two-part 
inquiry). 
 70. Sterling Drug, 450 F.2d at 709 (quoting S. REP. NO 89-813, at 9 (1965)).  Sterling Drug 
sought documents related to a competitor’s acquisition of a company after the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) had challenged Sterling Drug’s attempted acquisition of another company, a 
merger which Sterling Drug thought to be similar in nature to its competitor’s acquisition.  Id. at 
701–02.  Sterling Drug sought detailed documents related to its competitor’s purchase of the 
recently acquired company, and brought suit following the FTC’s nondisclosure of certain 
documents.  Id. at 702. 
 71. M. A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 470–71 (D.D.C. 1972).  The plaintiff 
requested a Securities and Exchange (SEC) study and all documents the agency received during 
its investigation related to the study.  Id. at 468–69. The SEC refused to disclose the information 
on Exemption 4 grounds, arguing for the protection of the privacy interests of those who provided 
the information.  Id. at 469.  The SEC also argued that the information requested was exempt 
under Exemptions 3, 5, 7, and 8.  Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (5), (7), (8) (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010). 
 72. M. A. Schapiro & Co., 339 F. Supp. at 470 (quoting Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 
935, 938 (D.C. 1970)). 
 73. Id. at 470–71. 
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unchecked assertions of confidentiality would create serious potential for 
abuse.74  
c.  The National Parks Test: A Two-Part Confidentiality Analysis 
In 1974, the D.C. Circuit significantly altered its confidentiality analysis 
through its holding in National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton.75  
Breaking from its holding in Sterling Drug, the D.C. Circuit held that 
determining confidentiality required more than merely assessing whether the 
provider of the information would disclose that information to the public.76  
The court found that, to satisfy judicial scrutiny, the withholding of 
information must comport with the legislative intent underlying whichever 
exemption is at issue.77  The court noted that altogether the exemptions serve 
two purposes: (1) protecting the interests of the government in efficiency, and 
(2) protecting the interests of persons providing information in maintaining 
confidentiality.78   The court distinguished between two separate interests that 
FOIA exemptions were created to protect: those of the federal government, and 
those of the people who had provided information to the government. 79  
Notably, Exemption 4 has the “dual purpose” of protecting both interests, 
whereas other exemptions usually only serve one.80 
Following a thorough examination of FOIA’s legislative history, the D.C. 
Circuit created a two-part test for evaluating confidentiality under Exemption 4 
to ensure that these twin interests are properly protected:   
                                                 
 74. Id. at 471 (citing Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 
582 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers Co., 424 F.2d at 938).  In Grumman, the D.C. Circuit ordered 
that the district court review the documents at issue to determine whether they contain 
information that the provider would not reveal to the public.  Grumman, 425 F.2d at 582.  In 
Bristol-Myers Co., the D.C. Circuit similarly ordered that the district court review the documents 
at issue because FOIA “does not permit a bare claim of confidentiality” and the courts have “the 
responsibility of determining the validity and extent of the claim.”  Bristol-Myers Co., 424 F.2d at 
938. 
 75. 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  National Parks is the leading case concerning 
Exemption 4 issues.  See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 162 n.24 
(3d Cir. 2000).  The National Parks and Conservation Association (Association) requested 
information regarding concession operations from the Director of the National Park Service.  
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404, 405 (D.D.C. 1972), rev’d, 498 
F.2d at 771.  The Park Service released the majority of the requested information, but refused to 
release audit and other financial information related to several businesses operating concessions 
within the national parks.  Id.  The Association then brought suit to compel the release of the 
information, but the Park Service maintained that it had properly withheld the information under 
Exemption 4.  Id. at 405–06.  Because both parties agreed that the information was financial, 
obtained from a person, and not privileged, the only question before the court was whether the 
information was confidential.  Id. at 406. 
 76. Nat’l Parks, 498 F.2d at 767. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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[C]ommercial or financial matter is “confidential” for purposes of 
the exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to have either 
of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government’s ability to 
obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial 
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the 
information was obtained.81 
The two-part test, which has become known as the “National Parks test,” has 
been used by the majority of circuit courts.82  However, legal scholars have 
criticized the test as being inconsistent with the language and the legislative 
intent of Exemption 4, which confine the intended analysis to whether the 
information would be customarily released to the public.83 
d. Critical Mass Categories: Continued Availability and Reliability 
The D.C. Circuit refined the National Parks test in Critical Mass Energy 
Project v. NRC.84  Petitioned to reconsider the National Parks holding, the 
D.C. Circuit determined that the NRC had failed to overcome the principle of 
stare decisis when arguing for the abandonment of the National Parks test.85  
The court cited three reasons supporting its refusal to overturn National  
                                                 
 81. Id. at 770 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The court recognized that the first part 
protects the governmental interest because “unless persons having necessary information can be 
assured that it will remain confidential, they may decline to cooperate with officials and the 
ability of the Government to make intelligent, well informed decisions will be impaired.”  Id.  
The second part protects the private interest of those providing information who would 
experience competition disadvantages if financial or commercial data was made public.  Id. at 
768. 
 82. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Pac. 
Architects & Eng’rs Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 906 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 946 (10th Cir. 1990); Acumenic Research & 
Tech. v. Dep’t of Justice, 843 F.2d 800, 807 (4th Cir. 1988); Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. 
Block, 755 F.2d 397, 398–99 (5th Cir. 1985); Gen. Elec. Co. v. NRC, 750 F.2d 1394, 1402–03 
(7th Cir. 1984); 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 7–10 (1st Cir. 1983); Am. Airlines, Inc., v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 
871 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 83. See, e.g., Richard L. Rainey, Stare Decisis and Statutory Interpretation: An Argument 
for a Complete Overruling of the National Parks Test, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1430, 1468–71 
(1993) (arguing not only that the National Parks test has no statutory basis, but positing that 
statutory language and congressional intent clearly show that the “would not be customarily 
released” test is the appropriate analysis); see also Thomas L. Patten & Kenneth W. Weinstein, 
Disclosure of Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 
ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 196 (1977) (“It is probably accurate to say that Congress did not have 
anything like the National Parks I test for confidentiality in mind when that term was inserted.”). 
 84. 975 F.2d at 880.  Critical Mass Energy Project (Critical Mass), a nonprofit organization, 
requested from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reports, which the NRC refused to 
disclose. Id. at 872.  The NRC claimed Exemption 4 protection applied because the NRC had 
received the reports from a separate business, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, on the 
condition that the reports be kept confidential.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 875–76. 
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Parks: (1) the “widespread acceptance” of the test in other circuits, 86  (2) 
Congress’s recognition of the test’s appropriateness in subsequent legislation,87 
and (3) the “workability” of the test in practice.88  Although it did not find the 
test problematic enough to overturn precedent, the court acknowledged that 
applying the test has its difficulties.89  Thus, the court felt it could “greatly 
simplify the application of Exemption 4 in a significant number of cases”90 by 
confining application of National Parks to information that the provider was 
required by law or otherwise to submit to the government.91  For voluntarily 
provided information, Exemption 4 would still apply if the provider would not 
customarily release it to the public.92 
The D.C. Circuit left the National Parks test intact regarding compelled 
information, but the court recognized an additional consideration affecting the 
governmental interest protected by the first part of the National Parks test.93  
Although disclosure of information might not impair the government’s ability 
to obtain information in the future when production of the information is 
mandatory, disclosure could negatively impact the quality of information 
because persons fearing disclosure might provide less reliable information.94  
Because the first part of the National Parks test protects the government’s 
ability to obtain necessary information for efficient operation,95 protecting the 
continued reliability of compelled information is implicit in the test.96  In other 
words, the court realized that the routine disclosure of compelled information 
could lead individuals and businesses to provide false or unreliable data in an 
                                                 
 86. Id. at 876 (citing decisions from seven different circuits that accept the National Parks 
test). 
 87. Id. at 876 (citing CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1152–53 & n.146 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006)).  In the legislative history of the § 552(b)  
open-meeting rules, Congress acquiesced to the National Parks test as the appropriate standard 
for interpreting the confidentiality exemption under that section, which protects Exemption 4. See 
Donovan, 830 F.2d at 1152–53 & n.146. 
 88. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 877.  The court observed that the precedent will be adhered to 
so long as it does not amount to “a ‘positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law’ or 
a ‘direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in other laws.’”  Id. (quoting 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3(a), 105 Stat. 1071). 
 89. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 877. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 880. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 878. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878; see also 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that the 
National Parks test was intended to protect the government’s ability to “make intelligent, well 
informed decisions”—an intention that the “necessary information implies (quoting Ntn’l Parks 
& Conservation Ass’n v. Marton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1979))). 
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effort to protect themselves from the repercussions of an agency’s 
disclosures.97 
Regarding the application of Exemption 4 to information voluntarily 
provided to the government, the court reverted to an earlier understanding of 
“confidential.” 98  Returning to Sterling Drug, the court held that voluntarily 
provided information will be deemed confidential if it “would customarily not 
be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.” 99  
Whereas the government’s interest in exempting compelled information is 
continued reliability of the information it receives, the government’s interest in 
exempting voluntary information is ensuring that persons continue to make 
such information available to the government. 100   Criticism once again 
followed the D.C. Circuit’s decision.101  Although eight circuits have accepted 
the National Parks test, not one has incorporated the Critical Mass categorical 
approach—choosing instead to defer the issue.102  
D.  The Public Domain: When Do Agencies Waive The Exemptions? 
Asserting an exemption is not always successful, even when an exemption 
may appear to be applicable.  An agency’s prior disclosure of the information 
may waive the protection under a FOIA exemption.103  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines waiver as “the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a legal 
right.”104  Courts have held that a prior disclosure waives an exemption only 
                                                 
 97. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878. 
 98. See supra Part I.C.3.b.  Compare id. at 879 (finding “that financial or commercial 
information provided to the Government on a voluntary basis is ‘confidential’ . . .  if it is of a kind 
that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained), 
with Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that information 
“which would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was 
obtained” qualified as “confidential” for the purposes of Exemption 4 (quoting S. REP. NO.  
89-813, at 9 (1965))). 
 99. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879; see also infra note 108. 
 100. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878. 
 101. See, e.g., Scott Raber, Reinventing a Less Vigorous Freedom of Information Act: The 
Aftermath of Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1994 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 79, 109 (1994) (commenting that the legislative history of Exemption 4 never 
distinguished between voluntary and involuntary submissions); G. Branch Taylor, Comment, The 
Critical Mass Decision: A Dangerous Blow to Exemption 4 Litigation, 2 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 133, 143 (1996) (concluding that through Critical Mass the D.C. Circuit has created 
a new loophole for agencies to withhold more information from the public). 
 102. See, e.g., Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 356 F.3d 588, 597 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(declining to decide whether Critical Mass applies); see also OSHA DATA/CIH, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 166 n.30 (3d Cir. 2000); Frazee v. U.S. Forest Serv., 97 F.3d 367, 372 (9th 
Cir. 1996); Nadler v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 92 F.3d 93, 96 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 103. See Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015–16 & n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(stating that the extent to which prior agency disclosure constitutes waiver depends on the 
circumstances and the exemption that is claimed). 
 104. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1717 (9th ed. 2009). The same definition applies in the 
context of waiving protection under FOIA exemptions.  See, e.g., Fla. House of Representatives 
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for those documents that were already disclosed.105  Moreover, whether an 
agency’s prior disclosure waives an exemption requires a case-by-case analysis 
dependent on the factual circumstances of the case and the specific exemptions 
implicated. 106   Once the agency has met its burden of proof satisfying a 
particular exemption, the burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure to prove 
that the exemption has been waived by a prior disclosure and the exemption 
can no longer serve its purpose.107 
The public-domain test—the prevailing test for determining waiver of FOIA 
exemptions—focuses on whether the information had already entered the 
public domain when the agency attempted to withhold it.108  To be in the 
public domain, the information must have been disclosed in a permanent 
public record.109  Additionally, the prior agency disclosure in a permanent 
                                                                                                                 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941, 946 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying the same definition 
when determining whether the Secretary of Commerce waived protection under Exemption 4).  
The court subsequently found no waiver because the disclosure was involuntary.  Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 879 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he release  of 
certain documents waives FOIA exemptions only for those documents released.”); see also 
Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[D]isclosure of a similar type of 
information in a different case does not mean the agency must make its disclosure in every 
case.”). 
 106. Carson, 631 F.2d at 1015–16 & n.30. 
 107. See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (requiring the party 
asserting a prior disclosure claim to highlight the specific information that duplicates the 
information being withheld); see also Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(“Under our public-domain doctrine, materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA 
lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Waiver doctrine 
stands for the proposition that the government cannot rely on an otherwise valid exemption [to 
FOIA] to justify withholding information that has been officially acknowledged or is in the public 
domain.” (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1279 
(D.C. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks ommitted)); Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of 
State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the government may not rely on a FOIA 
exemption if the information is in the public domain); Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554–55 (applying the 
public-domain test to a withholding under Exemption 3); Davis, 968 F.2d at 1279–80  
(acknowledging that the public-domain test applies to determining if waiver occurred); 
Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that disclosure is required 
despite an otherwise valid exemption claim when the specific information has already been made 
public in an official document (citing Afshar, 707 F.2d at 1130)); CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 
830 F.2d 1132, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“To the extent that any data requested under FOIA are in 
the public domain, the submitter is unable to make any claim to confidentiality—a sine qua non 
of Exemption 4.”); Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130 (stating that the plaintiff must point to specific 
information in the public domain to waive a FOIA exemption).  This standard evinces that 
whether an official disclosure has occurred determines what is in the public domain.  See Nat’l 
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004) (noting that “once there is 
disclosure, the information belongs to the general public”). 
 109. See Students Against Genocide, 257 F.3d at 836; Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554; Davis, 658 
F.2d at 1279–80. 
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public record must have been an official disclosure.110  Thus, absent an official 
disclosure in a permanent public record, an agency will not have waived the 
protection of a FOIA exemption. 111   For example, prior disclosure of 
information to an opposing party in litigation in accordance with the law does 
not constitute waiver so long as the information was not presented in open 
court.112 
E.  The Ninth Circuit’s Departure From the Public-Domain Test:  Can There 
Truly Be Waiver When the Government Has Not Made an Official Disclosure 
of Information to the Public? 
1.  Center for Auto Safety: Exemption 4 Is Not Waived by Limited 
Disclosure 
In 1997, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
requested information from nine automakers regarding the air-bag systems 
installed in their vehicles.113  All manufacturers responded and the NHTSA 
posted portions of the requested information on the Department of 
Transportation’s website.114  In early 1999, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) 
submitted a FOIA request for the remaining air-bag system information that 
NHTSA had not already made available online.115  The Agency first cited to 
Exemption 4 and denied the entire request, but later released redacted reports 
                                                 
 110. Compare Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the 
particular information at issue must have been already disclosed to the public in an official 
disclosure in order to constitute waiver), with Kimberlin v. Dep’t of Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 949 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (determining that vague references to a conclusion of an investigation do not 
constitute waiver).  In Wolf v. CIA, the court found the congressional testimony of the CIA 
director to be an official disclosure due to the public nature of the testimony. 473 F.3d at 379. 
 111. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 802 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205–06 
(D.D.C. 2011); see also Parker v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 141 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 2001); 
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Dalton, 974 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 112. See Cottone, 193 F.3d at 556 (“[A] constitutionally compelled disclosure to a single 
party simply does not enter the public domain.”); see also Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 249–50 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (noting that discoverability of certain information in litigation does not entitle a FOIA 
plaintiff to disclosure of that information).  In a recent Tenth Circuit decision, the court further 
limited the public-domain test for waiver by permitting the withholding of certain information 
presented in open court under Exemption 7.  See Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. 
Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 473 (2011).  The 
court held that the public-domain test only applies when the public disclosure renders the 
applicable exemption ineffective at serving its purpose.  Id. at 1253 (finding that exemption under 
§ 552(b)(7)(C) could still serve its purpose of protecting the family’s privacy interests even after 
the video and audio evidence were presented in open court). 
 113. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 
(D.D.C. 2000). 
 114. Id. at 2–3. 
 115. Id. at 3.  The information CAS requested fell into six categories: “air bag deployment, 
air bag cover, air bag system components, seatbelts, crash sensors, and system performance.”  Id. 
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to CAS after an administrative appeal.116  CAS then filed suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in an effort to compel production of 
the redacted information.117   
All manufacturers who provided the information to the NHTSA intervened 
in the case before the district court and argued that Exemption 4 protected the 
requested information for two reasons: the information constituted trade secrets 
and it was confidential commercial information obtained by a person.118  In 
addressing the confidential-commercial-information prong of Exemption 4, the 
court followed Critical Mass by analyzing whether the parties had voluntarily 
provided the information to the government or if production had been 
compelled by the NHTSA.119  Under the voluntary prong, Exemption 4 would 
protect the information if it was “not customarily disclosed to the public.”120  
In explaining the Critical Mass holding, the court went on to note that 
determining whether information is customarily disclosed is an objective 
analysis that “allows the submitter to make protected disclosures of the 
information, provided that such disclosures are not made to the general 
public.” 121   Under the mandatory prong, originally developed in National 
Parks, Exemption 4 would protect the information if it was not customarily 
disclosed to the public and disclosure would impair the government’s ability to 
obtain the information in the future or would cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the person who provided the information.122 
The main debate between CAS and the automakers turned on whether the 
information at issue was confidential. 123   The district court held that the 
information was voluntarily submitted to the NHTSA; thus, the information 
could be considered confidential if it was not customarily disclosed to the 
public.124  The court went on to note that “[l]imited disclosures, such as to 
suppliers or employees, do not preclude protection under Exemption 4, as long 
as those disclosures are not made to the general public.”125  Although CAS 
attempted to argue that the information had been disclosed in other 
materials,126 the court made clear that the past “discrete disclosures to persons 
                                                 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 14, 16. 
 119. Id. at 9. 
 120. Id.; see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 121. Center for Auto Safety, 93 F. Supp 2d at 10 (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880). 
 122. Id. (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767, 770 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974)); see also Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878. 
 123. Center for Auto Safety, 93 F. Supp 2d at 16. 
 124. Id. at 16–17. 
 125. Id. at 17–18.  (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880). 
 126. Id. at 18 (“Plaintiff’s . . . argument is that the manufacturers have revealed this 
information in . . . service manuals, specifications sent to suppliers . . . , in litigation, in  
publicly-available crash test films, in prior voluntary submissions to the NHTSA, and in press 
releases, annual reports, and other . . . disclosures to the general public.”). 
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or agencies who require[d] the information” were not customary disclosures 
and typically included confidentiality notices; therefore, the past disclosure did 
not establish that the information was no longer confidential.127   
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit generally approved of the district court’s holding 
regarding customary disclosure, but it found that the district court had 
misapplied earlier precedent by mistakenly claiming that CAS could not obtain 
disclosure unless it had proven that the information was customarily released 
and identical information had been disclosed in the past.128  To correct this 
error, the circuit court remanded the case to resolve remaining questions 
regarding the customary disclosure of certain pieces of information, but 
indicated that most of the district court’s holding would remain intact.129 
2.  Watkins: Exemption 4 Is Waived When No Limits Are Placed on a Prior 
Disclosure 
In Watkins v. United States Bureau of Customs & Border Protection, the 
Ninth Circuit adopted a more liberal test for determining whether Exemption 4 
had been waived. 130   Samuel Watkins, an intellectual-property attorney, 
submitted eight FOIA requests to the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) for disclosure of notices of seizure of infringing merchandise 
(notices)131 from several ports within the United States.132  When CBP seizes 
goods bearing markings considered to infringe on registered trademarks, then 
CBP will provide notices, which contain information generally kept 
confidential, to the affected trademark owners only.133  CBP does this to give 
trademark owners an opportunity to take expeditious action against the alleged 
counterfeiter.134  Although the Agency only discloses this information to the 
                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 151–52.  The D.C. Circuit initiated its analysis by recognizing that the case was 
not one of a “typical voluntary information submission” because the NHTSA did not have 
authority to compel the automakers to provide the information requested.  Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The D.C. Circuit, 
nonetheless, continued to analyze the case as one involving a voluntary disclosure to the NHTSA.  
Id. at 150. 
 129. Id. at 152–53. 
 130. 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 131. 19 C.F.R § 133.21(c) (2011) (requiring that notice be given to a trademark owner when 
merchandise is seized at customs for infringement).  These notices of seizure include the 
following information: “(1) the date the merchandise was imported; (2) the port of entry; (3) 
description of the merchandise; (4) quantity of the merchandise; (5) country of origin of the 
merchandise; (6) name and address of the exporter; (7) name and address of the importer; and (8) 
the name and address of the manufacturer.”  Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192. 
 132. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection; Disclosure of Information, 58 Fed. Reg. 
44,476, 44,476 (proposed Aug. 23, 1993); see also Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection; 
Disclosure of Information, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,249, 36,250 (proposed July 14, 1995) (explaining the 
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trademark owner, it places no condition or limit the trademark owner’s use or 
distribution of the notices. 135   Watkins eventually received copies of the 
notices,136 but CBP had heavily redacted them on the basis that Exemptions 2, 
4, 6, and 7 applied.137 
Watkins sued to obtain copies of the unredacted documents, arguing that 
CBP had waived Exemption 4 by sending the notices to the trademark 
owners.138  Both parties moved for summary judgment,139 and the district court 
found in favor of CBP.140  The district court rejected Watkins’s argument that 
                                                                                                                 
purpose of this notification is to streamline trademark owners’ remedies in place of the 
cumbersome FOIA procedure). 
 135. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–97. 
 136. Id.  Watkins encountered several issues after submitting his original requests.  Id. at 
1192.  Initially, he received no response or acknowledgement of the requests sent to several of the 
ports.  Id.  Additionally, other ports required FOIA processing fees in advance, with some fee 
totals reaching $30,000.  Id.  To reduce costs, Watkins modified his requests to cover a shorter 
period of time.  Id. 
 137. Id. at 1192–93.  Exemption 2 covers information “related solely to the internal personal 
rules and practices of an agency.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2006).  Exemption 6 covers “personnel 
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”  Id. § 552(b)(6).  Exemption 7 covers “records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law 
enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings . . . [or] (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy . . . .”  Id. § 552(b)(7). 
 138. Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., No. CV08-1679JLR, 2009 WL 
3633893, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2009), aff’d in part, 643 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 139. Id. at *1.  Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
56(a).  Indeed, “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary 
judgment.”  Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009).  
Summary judgment in favor of nondisclosure is appropriate when the agency’s supportive 
evidence describes “the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably 
specific detail, demonstrate[s] that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed 
exemption, and [is] not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of 
agency bad faith.”  Id. (quoting Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)).  Generally, courts use a two-step inquiry to asses a motion for summary judgment in 
FOIA cases: (1) “whether the agency has met its burden of proving that it fully discharged its 
obligations under FOIA,” and (2) “whether the agency has proven that the information that it did 
not disclose falls within one of the nine FOIA exemptions.”  See L.A. Times Commc’ns, LLC v. 
Dep’t of the Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d, 880, 893–94 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing 5 U.S.C.  
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (2006); Zemansky v. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 140. Watkins, 2009 WL 3633893, at *1.  Applying the Ninth Circuit’s test to determine the 
applicability of Exemption 4, the court found consensus with regard to the satisfaction of the first 
two elements of Exemption 4—“commercial or financial information” and “obtained from a 
person.”  Id. at *6.  The heart of the dispute centered on whether the information was 
“confidential.”  Id.  The district court recognizing that the Ninth Circuit had adopted the National 
Parks test, and found that it controlled in this case.  Id. at *7 (citing Frazec v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
97 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1996); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109,  
1112–13 (9th Cir. 1994)).  Under the National Parks test, material is confidential if it is likely 
either “(1) to impair the Government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) 
826 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:807 
the disclosure of the notices to trademark owners constituted a waiver of 
Exemption 4, holding instead that the “limited disclosure to interested  
third-parties [did] not operate to disqualify the information from protection 
under Exemption 4.”141 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination 
that the notices were commercial and that Exemption 4 normally applies to 
such notices.142  However, the court held that, in this case, “CBP waived the 
confidentiality of the notices by disclosing them to trademark owners without 
any limits on further dissemination.” 143   While acknowledging that the  
public-domain test constituted one method of determining waiver of 
confidentiality, the court concluded that it should not be the only test.144  The 
court reasoned that the public-domain test did not adequately address the 
concerns associated with the “no-strings-attached” disclosure because 
information so disclosed might still be made widely available to the public 
without being officially disclosed in a permanent public record.145  Thus, the 
court created a new “unlimited disclosure” test, which provided that waiver 
occurs when the government has disclosed information to any third party 
without placing limits on that person’s ability to further distribute the 
information.146 
II.  CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY ADHERES TO PRECEDENT WHILE WATKINS IS A 
MYSTERIOUS DEPARTURE 
In Critical Mass, the D.C. Circuit outlined several factors to consider when 
applying the principle of stare decisis to follow or abandon precedent.147  The 
D.C. Circuit’s holding in Center for Auto Safety comports with precedent and 
holds true to both the general purposes of FOIA, and the specific purposes of 
Exemption 4.148  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Watkins is contrary 
                                                                                                                 
to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information 
was obtained.”  Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Martin, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
The district court ruled that the information in the notices was confidential because disclosure 
would create a risk of substantial competitive harm to the importers; therefore, the information 
was exempt under Exemption 4.  Watkins, 2009 WL 3633893, at *9–10. 
 141. Id. at *10.  The court also noted that a statute required the limited disclosure, and 
compliance therein did not constitute waiver.  Id. 
 142. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195–96. 
 143. Id. at 1196. 
 144. Id. at 1197. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1198. 
 147. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 875–76 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(describing when it is appropriate for a court to abandon established precedent).  The D.C. Circuit 
focused on the widespread acceptance of its National Parks test, the subsequent acquiescence by 
Congress, and the lack of evidence to show that the test did not work.  Id. at 867–77. 
 148. See supra Part I.D (recognizing the public-domain test as the prevailing test to 
determine waiver of a FOIA exemption); infra Part II.A (arguing that Center for Auto Safety 
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to prior case law and Exemption 4’s underlying intent.149  Additionally, none 
of the factors considered by the D.C. Circuit in Critical Mass for observing 
stare decisis were present or acknowledged in Watkins, rendering the Ninth 
Circuit’s departure from the public-domain test unjustifiable.150 
A.  Center for Auto Safety: A Proper Use of the Waiver Doctrine 
The D.C. Circuit’s Center for Auto Safety decision is well grounded in logic, 
and the court’s reasoning accorded with other cases relying on the  
public-domain test.151  Although the court did not explicitly acknowledge the 
waiver doctrine or the public-domain test, both the district court and circuit 
court opinions analyzed whether the information at issue was customarily 
disclosed to the general public and whether prior limited disclosures of that 
information waived exemption protection.152  CAS attempted to argue that the 
automakers’ prior disclosures destroyed any claims of continuing 
confidentiality, but the court disagreed, characterizing the releases as “discrete 
disclosures to persons or agencies who require the information . . . [that had] 
generally been accompanied by confidentiality agreements . . . .”153  Consistent 
with other judicial precedent applying the public-domain test to find waiver 
when information is officially disclosed in a permanent public record,154 the 
D.C. Circuit correctly concluded that Exemption 4 protection still applied to 
the air-bag system information and had not been waived by prior 
                                                                                                                 
accords with precedent).  The underlying purpose of FOIA is to allow the general public to obtain 
information from the government and to ensure that certain items are protected from disclosure.  
See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965) (acknowledging that despite the policy of broad disclosure, 
some information should remain confidential); see also supra note 4 (describing Exemption 4 and 
explaining that the public-domain test is the primary test for determining waiver). 
 149. See supra Part I.C–D; infra Part II.B (explaining why the Ninth Circuit decided Watkins 
improperly). 
 150. Compare Critical Mass Energy Project, 975 F.2d at 876–77 (following the National 
Parks test because it is widely accepted, Congress has acquiesced to the test, and it is workable), 
with Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(concluding that the public-domain test should not be the only test for waiver). 
 151. See supra Part I.D (discussing the history of the waiver doctrine and the prevailing test 
for waiver); supra Part I.E.1 (discussing the court’s holding in Center for Auto Safety).  Although 
Center for Auto Safety focused on the auto manufacturer’s past disclosures and Watkins focuses 
on the agency’s disclosure, both equally focus on past disclosures and concern the continuing 
confidentiality of the information at issue.  See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
802 F. Supp. 2d 185, 206 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing to Center for Auto Safety and applying the 
limited-disclosure analysis to past disclosures by a government entity). 
 152. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144, 150 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d in part on other grounds, 244 F.3d 144. 
 153. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 18. 
 154. See supra Part I.D. 
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disclosures.155  A recent D.C. district court case has echoed the Center for Auto 
Safety holding by finding that no waiver occurred when information was 
previously disclosed in a limited fashion.156 
B.  Watkins: An Improper Interpretation of the Waiver Doctrine 
The Ninth Circuit’s use of the waiver doctrine to justify disclosure in 
Watkins is problematic.157  The court’s expansion of the doctrine compels a 
finding of a waiver whenever an agency freely discloses information to a 
private party without restricting further dissemination of the information.158  
Although the court considered whether the information qualified for 
Exemption 4,159 it only briefly discussed its departure from prevailing waiver 
doctrine. 160   The lack of detailed discussion regarding waiver doctrine is 
peculiar given that the court’s holding broadened the waiver doctrine by 
                                                 
 155. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 244 F.3d at 152–53 (noting that the district court found that the 
majority of the information at issue was not customarily disclosed in spite of earlier limited 
disclosures). 
 156. See Judicial Watch, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 205–06. 
 157. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1196–98 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (failing to follow the public-domain test when holding that a non-public disclosure to a 
private third party waived any exemption). 
 158. Id. at 1197. 
 159. Id. at 1194–96 (discussing whether Exemption 4 applied to the notices).  The court first 
addressed whether the information was “commercial or financial.”  Id. at 1194–95; see also supra 
Part I.C.1 (discussing the “commercial or financial” prong of Exemption 4).  Recognizing that 
“commercial” and “financial” are to be given their ordinary meaning, the court readily dismissed 
Watkins’s argument that the information was not commercial, as illegal dealings in counterfeits is 
not a “legitimate commercial activity.”  Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1194–95; see also Pub. Citizen 
Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that information 
can qualify as commercial if the provider of the information has a “commercial interest” in it).  
The court found that the relevant inquiry is whether the importation of goods in general qualifies 
as commercial because the seizure of goods was not a final determination that the goods were 
actually counterfeit.  Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195.  The notices contained plainly commercial 
information, such as supply chains and demand fluctuation.  Id.  The second prong of Exemption 
4 analysis was not in dispute, as indicated by a complete lack of discussion in the court’s opinion 
regarding whether the information was “obtained from a person.”  See id. at 1194–95; see also 
supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the “obtained from a person” prong of Exemption 4).  The second 
prong was clearly satisfied because the information was obtained from an importing company, 
which is included in the definition of “person.”  Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195; see also 5 U.S.C.  
§ 551(2) (2006).  The final step for the court was applying the National Parks test to determine if 
disclosure of the information is likely to either: “(1) impair the Government’s ability to obtain 
necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of 
the person from whom the information was obtained.”  Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. 
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also supra Part I.C.3.c (discussing the National 
Parks test). The Ninth Circuit limited the issue in Watkins to the second National Parks factor.  
Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1194.  The court found that CBP had demonstrated substantial harm because 
the evidence established actual competition in the market for imports and the likelihood that 
disclosure would risk substantial injury to the importers in that market.  Id. at 1196. 
 160. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–98. 
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significantly departing from prevailing law. 161   The bulk of the court’s 
reasoning focused on the potential for further disclosure by a third party, rather 
than actual disclosure in the public domain.162  Accordingly, the court ruled 
that as a “no-strings-attached disclosure,” the release of notices to trademark 
owners constituted waiver.163   
Contrary to the court’s decision, a review of the circumstances surrounding 
the disclosure in Watkins demonstrates that the notices provided to private 
parties do not in fact qualify as disclosures to the public so as to constitute a 
waiver.164  Instead, the release of the notices is a limited disclosure, made 
pursuant to a statute that requires notice be provided only to legitimate 
trademark owners whose intellectual property has been potentially infringed so 
that they can take action against the counterfeiters if they so desire.165  The 
disclosure in Watkins is remarkably similar to the disclosure in Center for Auto 
Safety in that the release in Watkins was limited to only “certain parties at 
interest,” rather than the public as a whole.166  Although the Watkins court 
focused on the potential for further dissemination of the notices due to the lack 
of confidentiality restrictions—a concern not at issue in Center for Auto 
Safety—there was still no “permanent public record” of the notices disclosed.  
This determination should end the inquiry when waiver doctrine is correctly 
applied.167 
Characterizing the notices as an official disclosure runs contrary to what 
other courts have recognized as official disclosures in other circumstances.168  
Although the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Watkins from cases 
protecting limited disclosure from the waiver doctrine because of the 
“overriding concerns for public safety and national security,”169 the court made 
no mention of prior case law in which the public-domain test was used in the 
context of Exemption 4.170  Much like the information released in Judicial 
                                                 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. at 1196–97 (“[The third party] can freely disseminate that information in ways that 
would compromise the purportedly sensitive information . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 163. Id.  at 1197. 
 164. See supra Part I.D (discussing the prevailing waiver test of whether information can be 
found in the public domain). 
 165. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006)); see also supra note 152 
and accompanying text. 
 166. Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection; Disclosure of Information, 60 Fed. Reg. 
36,249, 36,250 (proposed July 14, 1995) (noting that the seizure notices were to be provided “to 
certain parties at interest”); see also Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192 (explaining that the information is 
only provided to the owner of the potentially infringed trademark); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 244 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 167. See supra Part I.D. 
 168. See supra note 110. 
 169. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197. 
 170. See infra note 180. 
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Watch, the notices provided to trademark owners are similarly intended to keep 
interested parties apprised of information that concerns them.171  As the court 
recognized, requiring disclosure of the information in the notices under FOIA 
could cause the trademark owners the substantial competitive harm that 
Exemption 4 was intended to prevent.172  The limited disclosure of information 
relating to the seizure of allegedly counterfeit goods should not require 
universal disclosure of the confidential and commercial or financial 
information contained in the notices.173  The Agency did not distribute the 
notices in the public domain because they were not officially disclosed in a 
permanent public record; thus, protection from disclosure was not waived 
under the traditional understanding of the waiver doctrine. 174   The Ninth 
Circuit’s departure from past precedent could not have been anticipated by 
CBP.  As such, CBP had no notice that their “no limits” disclosure to 
trademark owners would constitute waiver when the existing requirements of 
the public-domain test were not satisfied.175 
Not only does the Watkins decision contradict the law in other circuits, but it 
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s previous holding in Bowen v. Food & Drug 
Administration, in which the court asserted that an agency’s prior disclosure 
does not necessarily waive future claims of exemption for information related 
to the disclosed information.176  The Watkins opinion does not mention Bowen 
in its waiver analysis, only briefly citing to the case in a general discussion of 
Exemption 4, and fails to acknowledge Bowen’s concern about the 
government’s ability to obtain information in the future if the documents 
requested were disclosed.177  In Bowen, the Agency placed no restrictions on 
the information that had been released, just as the Agency in Watkins placed no 
restrictions on the trademark owners regarding further dissemination. 178  
                                                 
 171. See Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection; Disclosure of Information, 60 Fed. 
Reg. at 36,250. 
 172. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196. 
 173. Compare Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding no waiver for 
wiretapped recordings that were only provided to counsel and not played in open court), with 
Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192 (stating that the information in the notices remains confidential except 
when disclosed to only those trademark owners whose trademarks may have been infringed). 
 174. See supra Part I.D (discussing the public-domain test and explaining that it is the 
prevailing test for waiver); see also Cottone, 193 F.3d at 555 (stating that the court “must be 
confident that the information sought is truly public and that the requester receive no more than 
what is publicly available before [it] find[s] a waiver”). 
 175. Thus, although there was no confidentiality agreement attached to the notices, as had 
been attached to the information disclosed in Center for Auto Safety, CBP expected such 
confidentiality to be kept as a result of previous customary action.  See generally Ctr. for Auto 
Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 176. 925 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 177. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195. 
 178. Compare Bowen, 925 F.2d at 1228 (noting that the FDA had provided documents to 
Bowen with no apparent restrictions), with Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1198 (finding that the 
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Additionally, the prior disclosure in Bowen was not considered official, just as 
the notices were not an official disclosure in Watkins.179 
More troublesome, the Ninth Circuit did not rely on any prior Exemption 4 
case law to reach its decision regarding waiver, instead distinguishing past 
cases in which the public-domain test was used for other exemptions. 180  
Without any precedential support, the court determined that the public-domain 
test “should not be the only test for government waiver.”181   The court’s 
reasoning for applying a new rule in this case is flawed.182  Additionally, the 
court’s reasoning notably lacks a supported explanation for why the  
well-recognized public-domain test does not adequately balance the underlying 
purposes of FOIA and its exemptions in this context while the  
unlimited-disclosure test does.183 
The Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]aken to its logical extreme, the ‘public 
domain’ test would still shield commercial information under Exemption 4 
even if CBP or an aggrieved trademark owner opened up the phonebook and 
faxed a copy of the seizure notice to every importer in the region.”184  This 
statement turns the waiver doctrine on its head because it ignores that 
government action in a prior disclosure is the focus of the waiver doctrine, 
rather than what any individual might do with the information.185  Here, the 
limited release of the notices to the trademark owners is quite distinguishable 
from an official release to the entire public. 186   Furthermore, nothing in 
Watkins indicated that the information at issue was ever disseminated beyond 
                                                                                                                 
government does not impose any restriction on the information’s dissemination when disclosure 
is made to a trademark owner). 
 179. Compare Bowen, 925 F.2d at 1228–29 (describing the release to Bowen as “erroneous” 
and “inadvertent[]”), with Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197 (describing the release of the notices as a 
“disclosure to a third party,” but not as an official disclosure to the public). 
 180. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–98 (citing to cases that applied the public-domain test in 
the context of “requests for sensitive information involving high-level criminal investigations or 
matters of national security”); see also Bowen, 925 F.2d at 1228–29 (explaining that prior Agency 
disclosures do not automatically nullify subsequent exemption claims).  The Watkins decision 
fails to mention any Exemption 4 case law that has applied the public-domain test.  See, e.g., 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 879 F.2d 698, 700–01 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that voluntary 
disclosures have “sometimes been held to waive FOIA exemptions” and noting that “[t]he policy 
underlying the exemption of certain categories of documents from FOIA disclosure requirements 
is that ‘legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by the release of certain 
types of information’” (quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982))). 
 181. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 1197–98. 
 184. Id. at 1197. 
 185. See Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015–16 & n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“[T]he extent to which prior agency disclosure may constitute a waiver of the FOIA exemptions 
must depend both on the circumstances of prior disclosure and on the particular exemptions 
claimed.” (emphasis added)). 
 186. See supra Part I.D. 
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the trademark owners themselves,187 a burden that Watkins had to meet to 
prevail on the claim that an exemption has been waived.188  Had CBP moved 
for a protective order, the Ninth Circuit could have made efforts to remedy 
their concerns by prohibiting the trademark owners from disclosing the 
notices.189  This solution seems much simpler than creating an entirely new test 
for the situation at hand.     
The Ninth Circuit expressed concerns about the “logical extreme” of the 
public-domain test, but failed to consider the “logical extreme” of its new 
test. 190   The unlimited-disclosure test states that “when an agency freely 
discloses to a third party confidential information covered by a FOIA 
exemption without limiting the third-party’s ability to further disseminate the 
information then the agency waives the ability to claim an exemption to a 
FOIA request for the disclosed information.”191  This test opens the door for a 
deluge of litigation surrounding the meaning of the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
because the court failed to define key terms such as “freely discloses,” 
“limiting,” and “third party.”192  If the agency’s disclosure to trademark owners 
is done “freely” even though such disclosure is mandated by statute,193 what is 
a coerced or involuntary disclosure?  Does an independent contractor who 
works with the agency qualify as a third party?  What sort of limit on the third 
party’s further dissemination of the information is sufficient to rebut an 
argument for waiver?  The court answered none of these questions, creating the 
need for guesswork in future cases. 194   As noted in Critical Mass, 
governmental disclosure of confidential information provided by persons may 
result in the collection of less reliable information in the future. 195  
Additionally, CBP sometimes seizes legitimate goods due to suspicion of 
                                                 
 187. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197 (providing that the trademark owner could compromise the 
information by freely dissemination the information to third parties, but failing to identify any 
actual further dissemination). 
 188. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting the 
unfairness that would result if the party arguing against disclosure “would have to identify all of 
the public sources in which the information contained in its documents is not reproduced”); see 
also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 189. See, e.g., Parker v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 141 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(stating that “inadvertent disclosure does not render . . . information publicly available for the 
purposes of future FOIA requests” and that the court could arguably issue a protective order to 
prevent further disclosures). 
 190. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197. 
 191. Id. at 1198. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. at 1197–98 (determining that disclosure under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) was a “no strings 
attached” disclosure); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006) (providing that the secretary shall 
notify the trademark owner when a good bears a counterfeit mark resembling the owner’s 
trademark). 
 194. See id. at 1199 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (stating that unlike the new test, the  
public-domain test is a clear rule that can be applied without guesswork). 
 195. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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trademark infringement, in which case the importer has done nothing wrong.196  
The eventual disclosure of the information in the notices would cause exactly 
the competitive harm Exemption 4 was designed to prevent because others will 
become aware of the importer’s trading partners, supply chains, and the 
manufacturers with whom they are dealing.197  Fear of this harm will make 
those providing the information in the notices reluctant to provide accurate 
information to the government in the future.198 
III.  A SOLUTION: PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR ALL 
The public-domain test has been and continues to be effective in deciding 
whether a waiver has occurred.199  The issue of waiver is particularly important 
with regard to Exemption 4 because, unlike other exemptions, Exemption 4 
protects information “obtained from a ‘person’ rather than information 
generated by the government.”200  Therefore, the government must ensure that 
such information is protected to avoid competitive harm to others who entrust 
the government with their confidential information.201  Up until Watkins, the 
public-domain test had effectively served this purpose.202   
The Ninth Circuit’s new unlimited-disclosure test enables disclosure of 
confidential information under FOIA in circumstances in which the 
information is not otherwise accessible to the public.203  The mere chance that 
trademark owners could disseminate the information to others should not be 
sufficient to show that confidentiality has been waived because the information 
has not actually been disclosed in a public fashion.204  The new test would 
require agencies and the courts to speculate as to whether a third party may 
                                                 
 196. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195 (acknowledging that “importers sometimes acquiesce in 
the Agency’s seizure and forfeiture of legitimate goods,” and therefore the notices do not 
necessarily document counterfeit merchandise). 
 197. See id. at 1196. 
 198. Cf. id. (providing that less reliable information may be provided in the future if 
confidentiality is not maintained). 
 199. See id. at 1199 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the public-domain test should be 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit); see also Part I.D. 
 200. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(reasoning that if information is disclosed, people may decline to cooperate in the future, which 
will impair government decision making). 
 201. See id. 
 202. See supra Part I.D (discussing the public-domain test as used to determine the 
applicability of FOIA’s waiver doctrine). 
 203. See supra Part II.B (arguing that the Ninth Circuit improperly focused on potential 
disclosures, rather than actual disclosures). 
 204. See supra Part I.D (explaining that a waiver occurs when information is actually 
disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record). 
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make further disclosures, rather than focusing on whether the government has 
made such disclosures and under what circumstances.205 
By creating a new test, the Ninth Circuit fashioned a rule inconsistent with 
both the core purpose of Exemption 4, which Congress intended to protect 
confidential commercial information provided by others,206  and the overall 
purpose of FOIA to “establish a general philosophy of full agency 
disclosure.”207  If the Watkins holding stands, the concerns voiced by the court 
in Critical Mass regarding the continued availability and reliability of useful 
information may come to fruition.208  Individuals who provide commercial 
information to the government, will be less willing to do so, and if compelled 
to do so, will provide less reliable information for fear that any government 
disclosure of the information—even a limited one—will subject the 
information to FOIA disclosure.209  Although the Watkins test might appear to 
accord with FOIA because it provides greater access to information,210 the 
increase in disclosure will result in a decrease in both the quality and quantity 
of information provided to the government in the future211—a result directly at 
odds with the interest sought to be protected under Exemption 4.212 
Moreover, the Watkins holding has created variance among federal courts in 
an area where uniformity is essential.213  Access to information through FOIA 
should not vary based on the jurisdiction within which the documents are 
located; yet, this is the exact effect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 214 
Information that would typically be protected by Exemption 4 in jurisdictions 
                                                 
 205. See Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he 
extent to which prior agency disclosure may constitute a waiver of FOIA exemptions must 
depend both on the circumstances of prior disclosure and on the particular exemptions claimed.”).  
In looking at the specific facts of the prior release of the notices, the court should have focused on 
what actually happened, not the possibility of other scenarios. 
 206. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965). 
 207. Id. at 4. 
 208. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(observing that when information is compelled, persons fearing a likelihood of disclosure will be 
more likely to provide less reliable information, and when information is not compelled, persons 
will be less likely to provide any). 
 209. See id. (describing how people will be less likely to trust the government to maintain 
confidentiality). 
 210. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 211. See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878. 
 212. Id. (exempting confidential commercial information to further the government’s interest 
in obtaining reliable information); see supra Part I.C.3.iv. 
 213. See supra Part II.B. 
 214. Cf. S. REP NO. 89-813, at 5 (1965) (stating that FOIA eliminates the test for who gets 
access to different information); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 
(1975) (stating that requesters’ rights under FOIA do not increase or decrease because they claim 
a greater interest in the information than others); United Tech. Corp. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
102 F.3d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he test outlined in National Parks does not appear to 
contemplate its application on a requester-specific basis.”). 
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following the public-domain test will likely be disclosed through the unlimited 
disclosure test in the Ninth Circuit.215   
A.  A Supreme Court Holding: Solidifying the Public-Domain Test 
In the fall of 2011, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in 
Prison Legal News v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, a case involving the 
scope of the public-domain test.216  The petition raised the question of whether 
the government can invoke a FOIA exemption when it has disclosed the same 
records “by placing them in the public domain as unsealed evidence in a public 
trial.”217  Because the Supreme Court decided not to grant certiorari, the Prison 
Legal News holding that the government could still invoke the exemption 
prevails and suggests that even those disclosures made in a relatively public 
setting, such as at trial, do not automatically result in the waiver of a FOIA 
exemption.218  The Prison Legal News holding highlights the weakness of 
Watkins.219  If documents such as those requested in Prison Legal News are 
exempt from disclosure,220 then limited release of the notices to trademark 
owners cannot constitute a waiver when the release is both less public and less 
of an official disclosure.221 
Following the Prison Legal News denial of certiorari and given the Ninth 
Circuit’s departure from the well-established test for waiver, a Supreme Court 
ruling on the validity of the Watkins test would be the best solution, given that 
the waiver doctrine has evolved through the common law and is not prescribed 
by statute.222  A grant of certiorari in Watkins, and a subsequent reversal, 
would allow the Supreme Court to directly address the Ninth Circuit’s finding 
that the public-domain test “should not be the only test for government 
                                                 
 215. Compare supra Part I.D (describing the public-domain test and the requirement that 
information be officially disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record), with supra Part 
I.E.2 (describing the broader test established in Watkins). 
 216. See Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252–53 
(10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 473 (2011). 
 217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Prison Legal News, 132 S. Ct. 473 (No. 10-1510), 
2011 WL 2421269. 
 218. See Prison Legal News, 628 F.3d at 1252–53 (explaining that the applicable exemption 
can still serve its purpose because the pictures were displayed to a limited group of people and not 
physically disseminated). 
 219. See supra Part II.B. 
 220. See Prison Legal News, 628 F.3d at 1253 (determining that specific images used in a 
trial were not publically disclosed). 
 221. See supra Part II.B.  Although there was physical dissemination of the notices to the 
trademark owners in Watkins, a factor not present in Prison Legal News, the notices were 
obtained by a limited group of people directly interested in the information provided.  As 
courtrooms and trials are typically open to the public, the images displayed in Prison Legal are 
arguably more “public” than the privately mailed notices in Watkins, even when the physical 
dissemination factor is present. 
 222. See supra Part I.D. 
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waiver.” 223   Alternatively, the Supreme Court could bring the  
unlimited-disclosure test within the scope of the public-domain test by 
expanding its definition of what is “public.”  This would allow for a uniform 
approach to the waiver doctrine.  In either case, the information at issue in 
Watkins should be shielded from disclosure due to the uniform understanding 
of the waiver doctrine at the time the notices were released. 
B.  A Legislative Solution: Amending FOIA  
Congressional action provides an alternative to Supreme Court review.  
Congress has amended FOIA several times in the past,224 and is in a position to 
establish a prevailing test for waiver by creating, for example, a new § 552(c) 
immediately following the nine exemptions detailed in § 552(b). 225   The 
amendment could establish that an agency would waive the exemptions 
enumerated above if the materials requested were: (1) released in a prior 
official disclosure, or (2) could be found in the public domain.226  Because the 
courts have already made attempts to define both official disclosure and when 
information is public,227 Congress could defer to those definitions unless there 
was a strong desire to solidify the definitions within the statute itself. 
Additionally, Congress could amend the statute governing the notices of 
seizure to specifically exempt their context from disclosure,228 which would 
bring the notices within the protection of Exemption 3.229   
C.  An Executive Response to Watkins: Amending the Seizure Regulations 
In the absence of a legislative amendment, the executive branch could limit 
the holding of Watkins by amending the regulations governing the notices of 
seizure.  The amendment could require that the notices contain a 
confidentiality statement230 or limit the type of information included in the 
notices so as to avoid the disclosure of confidential commercial or financial 
information altogether.231  In fact, prior to the current version of the regulation, 
                                                 
 223. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 
2011) (emphasis in original). 
 224. See supra Part I.B (discussing FOIA’s enactment and subsequent amendment). 
 225. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 226. See supra Part I.D. 
 227. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 228. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006) (providing that the secretary should give notice to 
aggrieved trademark owners when a design replicates their trademark). 
 229. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. IV 2010) (exempting information that has been 
“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute”). 
 230. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 18 
(D.D.C. 2000) (highlighting that the prior disclosures included confidentiality notices), rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 244 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 231. See 19 C.F.R § 133 (2011) (setting forth the information required to be included in the 
notices). 
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the agency satisfied the notice requirements by simply informing the trademark 
owner that a seizure occurred.232 
In the meantime, courts should continue to apply the well-established  
public-domain test while agencies should attempt to distinguish Watkins where 
possible and make efforts to affix a confidentiality notice to documents that are 
disclosed.  In doing so, the precedential effect of Watkins will be limited, thus 
protecting the underlying purposes of Exemption 4.233 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Freedom of Information Act’s waiver doctrine is an area in which 
uniformity is crucial.  Finding that an exemption has been waived based on the 
potential for third parties to disseminate the information will result in 
inconsistent decisions.  Consistent with FOIA, information should be disclosed 
to those requesting it based on the government’s actions.234  Varying levels of 
access to information based on a document’s location are contrary to the goals 
of FOIA, which seeks to permit any person to obtain information from the 
federal government.235  Although the main purpose of FOIA is the disclosure 
of information, 236  recognition of legitimate confidential interests for 
commercial information is one of the recognized goals reflected in Exemption 
4.237  As stated in Critical Mass, agencies must consider the future reliability of 
information obtained if commercial entities are under the impression that their 
confidential information may be released through a future FOIA request.238 
The public-domain test has thus far functioned successfully in striking a 
suitable balance between the public’s interest in disclosure and third parties’ 
interests in keeping their information confidential;239 the same cannot be said 
of the unlimited-disclosure test.  A true loss of confidentiality requires more 
than just the potential for further dissemination.  Without an appropriate 
balancing of these competing interests, the quantity and quality of information 





                                                 
 232. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 16, Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 
643 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35996), 2010 WL 894744 (explaining that before 19 
C.F.R. § 133.21 only notice of the fact of a seizure had to be disclosed). 
 233. See supra Part I.C. 
 234. See supra Part I.B. 
 235. See supra Part I.B. 
 236. See supra Part I.B. 
 237. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966). 
 238. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 239. See supra Part I.D. 
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